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NOTES
THE EROSION OF LEX LOCI DELICTI: TOWARD A MORE
RATIONAL CHOICE OF TORT LAW
Lawes were not made for their own sakes, but for the sake of those who
were to be guided by them; and though it is true they are and ought to
be sacred, yet, if they be or are become unusefull for their end, they must
either be amended if it may be, or new lawes be substituted.
Sir Matthew Hale, Considerations
Touching the Amendments of Lawes
Man is a gregarious animal. As such, he has historically sought the
company of other men. He has organized his world into innumerable
units-each with its own boundaries, each with its own laws. Once, when
immobility and relative isolation characterized his existence, few legal
complications arose from the policy differences that had been translated
into the laws of his governments. His choice of law rules were relatively
simple, predictable, and rigid. But as technology made Cairo as accessible
as California-made international communication almost as practical as
local conversation-the consequences of human interaction involved in-
creasing interstate and international elements.
In the twentieth century United States, a maturing of the judicial system
paralleled technological advance. As more cases posed choice of law ques-
ions, the courts recognized that the traditional rules did not properly
resolve them. With increasing frequency, the several jurisdictions have
abandoned the traditional choice of law concept and have sought new
approaches to the problem of determining which law applies to tort cases
involving interstate elements.
LEx Loci DELICTI
In the nineteenth century, choice of law rules became a part of the
Anglo-American common law.1 In the twentieth century, lex loci delicti,
I H. GooDmcH, CoNFLIcr OF LAWS 3 (Skoles ed. 1964); Dicey reports finding no
English decisions discussing conflict of laws issues prior to James I. But see Y.B.
Anonymous, 2 Edw. II 110 (1308), wherein a writ of debt was brought upon a docu-
ment drawn and executed at Berwick, Scotland. "[Biecause it was made at Berwick,
where this court has not cognizance, it was awarded that John took nothing by 'his
writ." In England, as late as 1859, the choice of law rules were described as "in-
complete and chaotic," the standard treatise being Story. See Dicey, Private Interna-
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the rule requiring the application of the tort law of the place of the wrong,
became well established.2 It was written into the first restatement by the
reporter, Professor Beale. Lex loci delicti gained widespread acceptance,
and has even recently been characterized as the "majority view" in the
United States.'
tional Law, 28 L.Q. REv. 341 (1912). In the United States, Wharton prefaced the
second edition of his conflict of laws treatise with the statement that there had been
as many decisions in the eleven years since 1870 as there had been prior to that time.
2 See Alabama Great So. R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).
3 REsTATEMENT OF CONFLICT LAWS §§ 337 et seq. (1934). See, e.g., Jordan v. State
Marine Corp., 257 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1958).
4 Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571
(1953); Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933); Texas & P. Ry. v. Humble, 181 U.S.
57 (1901); Alexander v. Inland Steel Co., 263 F.2d 314 (8th Cit. 1958); Philp v.
Macri, 261 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1958); Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); E. L. Farmer & Co. v. Hooks, 239 F.2d
547 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 911 (1957); Franklin v. Wills, 217 F.2d
899 (6th Cir. 1954); Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912
(7th Cit. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954), rehearing denied, 347 U.S. 979
(1954), rehearing denied, 348 U.S. 851 (1954); Black & Yates, Inc. v. Mahogony Ass'n.,
rehearing denied, 129 F.2d 227 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 672 (1941); Gray v.
Blight, 112 F.2d 696 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 704 (1940); Hunter v. Derby
Foods, Inc., 110 F.2d 970 (2d Cir. 1940); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hill, 163 Ala.
18, 50 So. 248 (1909); Maloy v. Taylor, 86 Ariz. 356, 346 P.2d 1086 (1959); Yazoo &
M.V.R.R. v. Littleton, 177 Ark. 199, 5 S.W.2d 930 (1928); Chasse v. Albert, 147
Conn. 680, 166 A.2d 148 (Sup. Ct. Err. 1960); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Andrews,
140 Ga. 254, 78 S.E. 925 (1913); Christiansen v. William Graver Tank Works, 223 111.
142, 79 N.E. 97 (1906); Holderman v. Pond, 45 Kan. 410, 25 P. 872 (1891); Matney v.
Blue Ribbon, Inc., 202 La. 505, 12 So. 2d 253 (1942); Watkins v. Cupit, 130 So.2d 720
(La. App. 1961); Pringle v. Gibson, 135 Me. 297, 195 A. 695 (1937), rehearing denied,
135 Me. 512, 197 A. 553 (1938); Walsh v. New York & N.E.R.R, 160 Mass. 571, 36 N.E.
584 (1894); Eskovitz v. Berger, 276 Mich. 536, 268 N.W. 883 (1936); Hall Motor
Freight v. Montgomery, 357 Mo. 1188, 212 S.W.2d 748 (1948); Neal v. Kropp, 299
S.W.2d 888 (Mo. App. 1957); Beacham v. Portsmouth Bridge, 68 N.H. 382, 40 A. 1066
(1896); Clement v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 13 N.J. 439, 100 A.2d 273 (1953); Charnock
v. Taylor, 223 N.C. 360, 26 S.E.2d 911 (1943); Collins v. McClure, 143 Ohio St. 569,
56 N.E.2d 171 (1944); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Bass, 229 S.C. 607, 93 S.E.2d
912 (1956); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Thompson, 100 Tex. 185, 97 S.W. 459 (1906);
Grandstaff v. Mercer, 214 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Goldman v. Beaudry,
122 Vt. 299, 170 A.2d 636 (1961); C.I.T. Corp. v. Guy, 170 Va. 16, 195 S.E. 659
(1938); Richardson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 11 Wash. 2d 288, 118 P.2d 985
(1941); Clise v. Prunty, 108 W. Va. 635, 152 S.E. 201 (1930); Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29,
269 P.2d 302 (1954). See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 379 (1934). For
cases specifying where the place of the tort is in different factual situations, see
Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1266 (1961).
5See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962). Although numerous decisions
since 1962 have doubtless decreased the size of the majority currently embracing lex
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Lex loci delicti favors a body of easily administerable rules the results
of which would be uniform, would conform to justifiable expectations, and
would discourage forum shopping.' However, the law of the place of the
wrong, even if uniformly applied, serves these goals no more adequately
than the law of any other state. Thus, it has been suggested that the objec-
tives sought by the application of lex loci delicti could be better served
by referring all disputes presenting choice of law problems to the law
of Alaska.' Furthermore, it is questionable whether the objectives lex loci
delicti purports to serve are, in themselves, the paramount goals to be
attained in the choice of law process.8
EROSION or LEX Loci DELICTI
Dissatisfaction with the harsh results of the application of lex loci delicti
led to judicial constriction of the rule in three important ways: the lex
fori-the internal law of the forum-was applied to matter characterized
as procedural,9 and the lex loci delicti was not applied when it contravened
loci delicti, most courts have not had recent occasion to reexamine their prior
decisions relying on lex loci delicti. Thus, it may still be said to be the general rule.
Furthermore, the highest courts of some states have considered arguments based on
the merits of the modem approaches to choice of law, but have refused to adopt
these approaches, reaffirming lex loci delicti instead. See, e.g., McGinty v. Ballentine
Produce, Inc., 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966); Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn.
303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Folk v. York-Shipley, Inc., 239 A.2d 236 (Del. 1968);
Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,
201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967); McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965);
Cook v. Pryor, 251 Md. 41, 246 A.2d 271 (1968); Petrea v. Ryder Tank Lines, Inc.,
264 N.C. 230, 141 S.E.2d 278 (1965); Cobb v. Clark, 265 N.C. 194, 143 S.E.2d 103
(1965); Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963); Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244 S.C.
249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964); Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182
(Tex. 1968).
6Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963);
see Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CorJm. L. Rnv. 959, 976
(1952); Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 156, 165-67
(1929); Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law, 19 TL.
L. REv. 4, 22-23 (1944).
7 B. CumE, SELEcrED EssAYs oN THE CONFLIcr oF LAWS 699-700 (1963).
8 The modem approaches to the choice of tort law proceed on the premise that a
preferable objective is to refer the decision of the case to the law of that state which
is determined-by various means-to have the greatest interest in its resolution.
9The process of characterization, whether it relates to the substantive-procedural
distinction, or to the classification of the type of case, (tort-contract) is usually per-
formed under the law of the forum. Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1955);
Hall v. Copco Pacific, Ltd., 224 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1955); King Bros. Prod., Inc. v.
RKO Teleradio Pictures, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). An outrageous
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a strong public policy of the forum state.'" The occasional application
of the renvoi doctrine offered a third escape route to courts seeking uni-
formity otherwise unattainable under lex loci delicti." The invocation
of these three doctrines appears in retrospect to presage the adoption of
the "approach" techniques which dominate present-day choice of law
rationale.12
MODERN APPROACHES TO CHOICE OF LAW
Early judicial efforts to formulate a replacement for lex loci delicti
viewed the rule as an inadequate index of the interests of the various
states whose law could apply to a multi-contact tort situation. The courts
emphasized that the fortuitous circumstance of the wrong occurring in a
given state did not give that state a controlling interest in the resolution
of the dispute." The question of what does amount to a controlling interest,
however, and how it should be determined has not been answered uni-
formly by those courts adopting modem approaches to the choice of tort
law.'14
mischaracterization, however, may violate the full faith and credit and due process
clauses of the federal constitution. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299
U.S. 178 (1936). See Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953); First Natl
Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
'OTexas & P. Ry. v. Humble, 181 U.S. 57 (1901); Gray v. Blight, 112 F.2d 696
(loth Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 704 (1940); Gaines v. Poindexter, 155 F. Supp. 638
(W.D. La. 1957); Ingle v. Cassady, 208 N.C. 497, 181 SE. 562 (1935); Nelson v.
Chesapeake & O.R.R., 88 Va. 971, 14 SE. 838 (1892); Dallas v. Whitney, 118 W. Va.
106, 188 SE. 766 (1936); REStATEMENT OF CoN Lur OF LAWS § 612 (1934). The
forum policy is expressed in its statutes. See Dougherty v. American McKenna Process
Co., 255 Ill. 369, 99 N.E. 619 (1912). Furthermore, where liability exists by peculiar
statute in a foreign country, enforcement is against the policy of the forum state
which has no such statute. Victor v. Sperry, 163 Cal. App. 2d 518, 329 P.2d 728
(1958). However, the mere fact that a lesser degree of negligence is actionable in
the foreign state does not make the action against forum policy. Kingery v. Donnell,
222 Iowa 241, 268 N.W. 617 (1936).
11See In re Schneider, 198 Misc. 1017, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652, aff'd, 100 N.Y.S.2d 371
(Sup. Ct. 1950); Dean, The Conflict of Conflict of Laws, 3 STAN. L. REv. 388 (1951);
Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HAlv. L. REV. 1165 (1938).
12 A search for a decision which is based primarily on "justice" has long been
advocated by scholars in the field of choice of law. See, e.g., Harper, Policy Bases of
the Conflict of Laws, 56 YALE L.J. 1155 (1947).
'3Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 NE.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1961).
14 In an increasing number of tort cases, the courts have discarded lex loci delicti
in favor of an approach that requires an analysis of the factors involved in the case
to determine what law should be applied to the particular issues of the case. Tramontana
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The Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, in its proposed official
draft, suggests that the law of the state having the "most significant rela-
tionship" with the occurrence or the parties should control the particular
issues raised. But the Restatement provides inadequate standards by which
the "relationships" are to be weighed or evaluated. The result is a highly
subjective choice of tort law. 5 The "grouping of contacts," or "center
of gravity" approach to the choice of tort law represents a more refined
approach. However, the role of the involved states' policy in the choice
of law process is unclear, and there has been some difficulty in applying the
test to various factual situations. 6 The "Interest-analysis" approach to the
v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1965); Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc., 357 F.2d 581
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965); Armstrong v.
Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alaska 1968); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447
P.2d 254 (1968); Howe v. Diversified Builders, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 741, 69 Cal.
Rptr 56 (1968); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727 (1967);
Schneider v. Schimmels, 256 Cal. App. 2d 366, 64 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1967); Fuerste v.
Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d
410 (1965); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Schneider v. Nichols,
280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968); Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d
66 (1966); Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966); Mitchell v.
Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Doiron v. Doiron, 241 A.2d 372 (N.H. 1968);
Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966); Dow v. Larrabee, 107 N.H.
70, 217 A.2d 506 (1966); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Van
Dyke v. Bolues, 107 N.J. Super. 338, 258 A.2d 372 (1969); Maffatone v. Woodson,
99 N.J. Super. 559, 240 A.2d 693 (1968); Mullane v. Stavola, 101 N.J. Super. 184, 243
A.2d 842 (1968); Farber v. Smolack, 20 N.Y. 198, 229 N..2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248
(1967); Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965);
Long v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d
513 (1965); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 NE.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963);
DeFoor v. Lematta, 437 P.2d 107 (Ore. 1968); Casey v. Manson Const. & Eng. Co.,
247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967); McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677
(1966); Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966); Woodward v.
Stewart, 243 A.2d 917 (R.I.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 957 (1968); Zelinger v. State Sand
& Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968); Conklin v. Hormer, 38 Wis. 2d
468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968). The flexibility of modern approaches to choice of
law has been praised. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the "Better Rule":
Threat and Promise in Multi-State Tort Law, 53 VA. L. Rxv. 847 (1967). On the
other hand, the same flexibility has raised the possibility that the courts will revert to
lex loci delicti in despair at the present confusion. D. Cavers, TiH CHoicE OF LAw
Paocass, 121-122 (1965). See generally Conflict of Laws Round Table, 49 Tzx. L. REv.
211 (1971).
15
RF-STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNaLiGT OF LAws § 145 (Proposed Official Draft,
Part II, 1968). See p. 336 infra.16 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963);
see p. 338 infra.
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choice of law requires the application of the law of that state having the
greatest interest in applying its policy to the resolution of the dispute. Yet,
an effort to evaluate the various interests of the states presupposes some
form of "superlaw" which assigns weights to the various interests. Such
a "superlaw" does not exist.' 7 Leflar's list of "Choice-Influencing Consid-
erations" delineates factors that should enter the choice of law process,
but allows the deciding judge to weigh his decision in favor of whichever
rule of law he considers to be the "better rule." This degree of subjectivity,
assuming that the "better rule" has a place in the choice of law process
at all, allows the forum court wide latitude to apply its own law. 8 Further-
more, when the results of decisions reached under the modem approaches
to choice of law are compared with the results reached by applying lex
loci delicti, a surprising similarity appears. 9
The forum state's practice of analyzing the interests of the involved
states for choice of law purposes has received general constitutional ap-
proval.2" However, it is as yet unclear which particular methods of deter-
mining the applicable law will satisfy due process and full faith and credit
requirements.2 ' It is suggested that the test of "fair play and substantial
justice" which a state must meet in order to exercise judicial jurisdiction
over a case involving foreign elements22 will also apply to the presently
evolving choice of law rules.
THE SECOND RESTATEMENT
The Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, in its Proposed Official
Draft,22 replaces the First Restatement's endorsement of lex loci delicti "
with the proposition that "the rights and liabilities of the parties with
respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state
17 See p. 341 infra.
18 See p. 343 infra.
19 See p. 345 infra.
20 See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
21 See Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912
(1962); Currie, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 595 (1968); Leflar,
Constitutional Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 706 (1963).
22 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The "minimal con-
tacts" which will permit the acquisition of personal jurisdiction must afford a
"substantial connection" with the forum state. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958); McGee v. Internatibnal Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
23 REsrATEmENT (SECOND) OF CoNTLicr OF LAWS § 145 (Proposed Official Draft,
Part II, 1968).
2 4
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 337 et seq. (1934).
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which, as to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occur-
rence and the parties ... ." 25
The contacts28 to be taken into account in determining the law applica-
ble to an issue include the place where the injury occurred,27 the place
where the conduct causing the injury occurred,28 the domicil, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties,2"
as well as the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties
is centered."
In evaluating the various contacts, the Second Restatement postulates
that the court should consider their importance with respect to the par-
ticular issues of the case.
Furthermore, the Second Restatement recognizes a number of general
factors that become relevant in any choice of law process-tort or other-
wise. Clearly, a court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a
statutory directive of its own state on choice of law if one exists."' In the
event there is no statutory directive-the usual case-it sets forth its own
factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law. These factors
include the needs of the interstate and international systems,32 the relevant
policies of the forum33 and other interested states,3" the relative interests
of other states in the determination of a particular issue, 5 the protection
of justified expectations, 8 the basic policies underlying the particular field
of law," certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result,38 and ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied.39 The weight given
25 P EsATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNFLIcr OF LAWS § 145(1) (Proposed Official Draft,
Part I, 1968).
26. Id § 145(2).
271d. § 145(2) (a).
28Id § 145(2) (b).
29 Id. § 145 (2) (c).
SId. § 145(2) (d).
S lId. 56(1).
32 Id. § 6(2) (a). See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S.
354, 382-383 (1959); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953).
33REsTATEmmNT (SEcoiN) OF Coaucr OF LAWS § 6(2) (b) (Proposed Official Draft,
Part II, 1968).
3 41d. § 6(2) (c).
35 Id.
36Id. § 6(2)(d).
3Id. § 6(2) (e).
38 Id. § 6(2)(f).
,3Od. § 6(2)(g).
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each of these enumerated considerations varies according to the type of case
before the court.4"
A most outstanding characteristic of the Second Restatement's "most
significant relationships" position on choice of law is its controversiality.
Although approved by some authorities,41 it is more often-and more
cogently-criticized because of its subjectivity.42 Nevertheless, the "most
significant relationships" approach to the choice of law has gained a degree
of recognition in the courts.43
GROUPING OF CONTACTS
The leading case representing a modem approach to choice of tort law44
espouses the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" theory-that
the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest "contacts" with the occur-
rence, or the jurisdiction where the "center of gravity" of the occurrence
or the parties may be found, controls the disposition of the particular
40 In Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966), the court looked to es-
sentially similar factors in deciding a choice of law question. See generally Cheatham
and Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLTuM. L. REv. 959 (1952); Leflar,
Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 267 (1966);
Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
1584 (1966); Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTrrazm.
PROB. 679 (1963); Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary? 37 TxAs L. Ray.
657 (1959).
41 See, e.g., Moreland, Conflicts of Law-Cboice of Law in Torts-A Critique, 56 Ky.
L.J. 5 (1967).
42 "The trouble with [the Second Restatement] theory is that the quest for 'most
significant contacts' that it enjoined was not implemented by any standard according
to which significance could be determined. 'One "contact" seems to be about as
good as another for almost any purpose. The "contacts" are totted up and a highly
subjective fiat is issued to the effect that one group of contacts or the other is the
more significant. The reasons for the conclusion are too elusive for objective evalua-
tion."' Currie, Conmzents on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in Conflict
of Laws, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 1233 (1963). See Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts
Restatement: A Last Appeal for its Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1230 (1965).
Comment, The Second Conflicts Restatement of Torts: A Caveat, 51 CALIF. L. REv.
(1963).
43See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963);
see generally, Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 979 (1968); Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Abendschein v.
Farrell, 11 Mich. App. 662, 162 N.W.2d 165 (1968), aff'd, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.V.2d
137 (1969); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Tattis v. Karthans, 215 So. 2d
685, 691 (Miss. 1968).
44Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). See
Conments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws,
63 COLUM. L. REv. 1212 (1963).
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issues in the case. In Babcock v. Jackson,4" lex loci delicti was decisively
abandoned in favor of a modem approach to the choice of law:
Justice, fairness, and "the best practical result. .. " may best be achieved
by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because
of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the
greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation.46
The terms "center of gravity" and "grouping of contacts" are no more
than catchwords or labels whose function is to designate an approach
rather than to define a principle of law.4" However, they are at least as
adequate to define a principle of law as the terms "due process of law,"
"property," "reasonableness," and "unjust enrichment," which the courts
constantly employ."8
The essence of the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" theory
may be stated as an abstract rule of law with relative ease. However, the
concept has little meaning apart from the criteria employed to determine
when a contact exists, and what qualitative weight will be assigned to the
several contacts which may be present in particular cases. It is in deter-
mining and weighing the contacts that the courts have evidenced some
disagreement when applying the "grouping of contacts" test. 9
In Babcock v. Jackson,5" the New York Court of Appeals concluded
that New York's interest in determining the liability of a New York guest
injured by the negligence of a New York host while driving in Ontario
outweighed any interest Ontario might claim to have. However, beyond
the facts of that particular case, the court developed no guidelines for
determining when a contact exists, or how it is to be weighed. Further-
45 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
46 Id. at 481.
47Id. at 486 (dissenting opinion).
48 Cheatham, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict
of Laws, 63 COLutm. L. REv. 1229, 1230 (1963).
49 The most apparent uncertainty to develop from the cases subsequent to Babcock
centers around the role played by state policy in the grouping of contracts approach.
See Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 NE.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965); Macey v.
Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966); In re Chrichton,
20 N.Y.2d 124, 135 n.8, 228 N.E.2d 799, 806 n.8, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811, 820 n.9 (1967);
Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734, amend. remittitur
denied, 22 N.Y.2d 722, 239 NE.2d 204, 292 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1968) (the facts or contacts
which obtain significance in defining state interests are those which relate to the
purpose of the particular law in conflict).
50 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
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more, subsequent cases have not agreed on the content of, or the qualita-
tive weight to be assigned to such contacts."'
In Babcock, the court purported to rely on the "most significant rela-
tionship" view espoused by the Second Restatement. Yet, the Second
Restatement, in its present form, does not require the excellent result
reached in the case." The court concluded that New York had a con-
trolling policy interest in the outcome of the case, and that Ontario had
no such interest. A consideration of the governmental policies underlying
the competing laws of two or more jurisdictions, and a determination of
whether the policies conflict, are characteristic of the "governmental in-
terest" approach to the choice of law pioneered by the late Professor
Brainerd Currie,53 rather than characteristic of a "most significant rela-
tionship" analysis. Although the court did not expressly rely on Currie's
doctrine in deciding Babcock, other courts have regarded his theory as
controlling when presented with similar factual situations.54
The choice of law process adopted in Babcock requires a separation of
the different issues presented by a given case. It is entirely possible that
individual issues may ultimately be decided under the law of different
states. In addition, it requires an identification of the various states whose
law could apply, and a determination whether there is indeed a conflict
on the isolated issue among them. An analysis of the contacts the respec-
tive jurisdictions have with the occurrence ultimately determines which
state has a paramount interest in having its policy or law applied.
In Dym v. Gordon," the New York Court of Appeals applied a similar
test to an automobile accident between New York domiciliaries temporarily
residing in Colorado. The court held the relevant factors to include: where
the relationship between the parties was formed, the basis of its formation,
and the domicile of the parties. The court cautioned against a quantitative
"adding up" of the contracts,5" clearly expressing a requirement that the
evaluation must be qualitative.
51 See cases cited note 41 supra.
52 Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of
Laws, 63 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1233, 1235 (1963).
53See B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE COMNFtLcr OF LAWS (1963); Currie, The
Constitution and the Choice of Law: Goveranental Interests and the Judicial Function,
26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9 (1958).
54 See Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 482 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967);
Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970); McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86,
215 A.2d 677 (1966).
55 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
56 Courts in other jurisdictions, however, have occasionally engaged in a process
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The role played by the policy interests of the various governments in
the choice of law process is unclear as a result of the New York cases subse-
quent to Babcock v. Jackson. In Babcock, the policies of the concerned
jurisdictions were highly relevant to the outcome of the case: "New York's
policy of requiring a tort-feasor to compensate his guest for injuries caused
by his negligence cannot be doubted. . . ." " However, the court is
believed to have retreated from that position in Dym v. Gordon.8 Further-
more, in Macey v. Rozbicki,"9 it was indicated that New York had not
adopted a policy-centered approach. Yet, the New York Court has more
recently stated that "contacts obtain significance only to the extent that
they relate to the policies sought to be vindicated by the conflicting laws." 6
INTEREST ANALYSIS
The late Professor Brainerd Currie was the leading exponent of a choice
of law process that weighs the interests of the various governments which
might claim the right to have a dispute adjudicated according to their
law.' Currie criticized the Second Restatement's position of "most sig-
nificant relationships" because it establishes no standards by which the
significance of a given contact could be determined. "One 'contact' seems
to be about as good as another for almost any purpose. The 'contacts'
are totted up and a highly subjective fiat is issued to the effect that one
group of contacts or the other is more significant." 6 For the purpose of
finding the rule of decision in a particular case, Currie would substitute
his own principles for those found in the Second Restatement:
of quantitative addition of contracts to determine the applicable law. See, e.g.,
Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968); Haag v. Barnes, 9
N.Y.2d 554, 175 NE.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961).
57 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 748 (1963).
s 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
59 19 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
'O In re Chrichton, 20 N.Y.2d 124, 135 n.8, 228 N.E.2d 799, 806, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811, 820
(1967). See Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d
647 (1970).
01 See B. CURMIE, SELECIED ESSAYS ON TE CONFLIcT OF LAWS (1963); Currie, Comments
on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLuM. L. Rv.
1233 (1963). Professor Ehrenzweig, however, considers this approach "unfortunate."
Ehrenzweig, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. R~v. 570 (1968). He further
believes that the alterations made to Currie's approach by the courts have probably
made it unacceptable to its principal advocate. A. EHRNzw~i, CoNFLIcrS rN A NUTsHELL
31 (2d ed. 1970).
62 Currie, Commnents on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of
Laws, 63 CoL.um. L. REv. 1233 (1963).
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When a court is asked to apply the law of a foreign state different
from the law of the forum, it should inquire into the policies expressed
in the respective laws, and into the circumstances in which it is reasonable
for the respective states to assert an interest in the application of those
policies. In making these determinations the court should employ the
ordainary processes of construction and interpretation.
... If the court finds that one state has an interest in the application of
its policy in the circumstances of the case and the other has none, it
should apply the law of the only interested state.
• . . If the court finds an apparent conflict between the interests of the
two states it should reconsider. A more moderate and restrained interpre-
tation of the policy or interest of one state or the other may avoid
conflict.
• . . If, upon reconsideration, the court finds that a conflict between the
legitimate interests of the two states is unavoidable, it should apply the
law of the forum.
• . . If the forum is disinterested, but an unavoidable conflict exists be-
tween the laws of the two other states, and the court cannot with justice
decline to adjudicate the case, it should apply the law of the forum-
until someone comes along with a better idea.
• . . The conflict of interest between states will result in different disposi-
tions of the same problem, depending on where the action is brought.
If with respect to a particular problem this appears seriously to infringe
a strong national interest in uniformity of decision, the court should not
attempt to improvise a solution sacrificing the legitimate interest interest
of its own state, but should leave to Congress, exercising its powers under
the full faith and credit clause, the determination of which interest shall
be required to yield.63
California adopted the language of the "governmental interests" ap-
proach to the choice of law in Reich v. Purcell.64 The court concluded that
when the application of the law of the place of the wrong would defeat
the interests of the litigants and the states concerned, it would not apply
that law, but would determine the law that most appropriately applied to
the issue presented.65
The reference to both state and individual interests in Reich may be
viewed as unnecessary duplication. Once the court considers the state's
63 Id. at 1242.
6467 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967). See Ehrenzweig, Comzents




interest in a choice of law case, that interest-meaning policy-will be to
give appropriate recognition to the legitimate interests of the litigants.66
On the other hand, Reich has been criticized for its very reliance on any
sort of state interest. State interest, Professor Ehrenzweig postulates, pre-
supposes the existence of some form of "superlaw" under which the priority
of states' interests could be determined. Such a "superlaw" does not exist.
Once it is recognized that the state interest approach fails, becoming mere
surplusage, it is not surprising that the court based its reasoning entirely
on the more tangible interests of the litigants.67
CHOICE-INFLUENCING CONSIDERATIONS
At the threshold of an analytical approach to the choice of law lies the
recurring problem of which considerations should be relevant to the deter-
mination of the law applicable to the individual issues in a tort case.
Professor Robert A. Leflar has identified five factors, called "choice-influ-
encing considerations," which serve as a practical vehicle for the decision
of specific cases.6" They include predictability of results, maintenance of
interstate and international order, simplification of the judicial task, ad-
vancement of the forum's governmental interests, and application of the
"better rule of law."6 The "choice-influencing considerations" approach
to the choice of law did not originate with Leflar. Professors Cheatham
and Reese were among the first to analyze such considerations, narrowing
them to nine factors" whose influence may be seen in the proposed position
of the Second Restatement." Professor Yntema has also listed seventeen
"policy considerations" which cover related factors."
The extent to which Leflar's list represents a valuable addition to cur-
rent choice of law doctrine is evidenced by the fact that the courts of
66Weintraub, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.LAL. REv. 556 (1968).
67 Ehrenzweig, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 570 (1968).
68R. LEFLAR, AMmRcAN CONFLICTS LAW 233-265 (1968); Leflar, Choice-Influencing
Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267 (1966); Leflar More on Choice-
Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1584 (1966).
Z9 Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.UL. REv. 267
(1966).
7 0 Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CoLuM. L. REv. 959 (1952).
71 See, e.g., REsrATEAMNT (SEcom) OF CoNFLiCr OF LAWS § 6 (Proposed Official
Draft, Part II, 1968).
7 2 Yntema, The Objectives of Private International Law, 35 CAN. BAm REv. 721 (1957).
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several jurisdictions have applied it to particular disputes,7 3 lauding its
combination of "workable brevity" and "reasoned analysis.""
In tort cases, Leflar's consideration of the advance predictability of
results has been viewed as largely irrelevant because negligence is not
planned. However, the parties' expectations as to legal liability and insur-
ance coverage, if in fact they had any such expectations, would be with
reference to their own state. Which lends support to Leflar's consideration
of advancement of the forum's governmental interests. The courts adopting
this approach recognize their duty to advance their own governmental
interests, and do so, where possible, by weighing that interest more heavily
than the interests of other governments whose law could apply to the case."5
Leflar's preference for the "better rule of law" represents an open and
frank recognition of a factor tacitly underlying the entire common law
process wherein the courts overrule old precedents, or adopt one rule rather
than another in a case of first impression. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's
decision in Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co."8 turned, in part, upon a
determination that the lex fori was the better rule of law:
While in this case we consider our own law to be the better law, we
must state it is applied for that reason and not because it is the law of the
place of the wrong or the law of the forum. All other considerations being
the same on this issue, we would apply the law of a nonforum state if it
were the better law. 77
Although the "better rule" consideration should not become the sole factor
on which the choice of tort law is based, it is wise to consider the better
rule in the choice of law process. It is often easier for a courageous judge
to prepare the way for a reform of inferior domestic law by his open
preference for "better" foreign solutions. He thereby diminishes the
adverse effect which a changing of the domestic rule would have on cer-
tainty and the expectations of the parties."8 On the other hand, without
73 Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Woodward v. Stewart, 243
A.2d 917 (R.L), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 957 (1968); Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co.,
38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968).
74 Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917 (R.I.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 957 (1968).
75 See Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. A leading advocate of invoking the "better rule"
has been Professor Cavers. See D. CAVERs, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 9, 79 (1965).
351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
76 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968).
77 Id.
78 Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the "Better Rule": Threat and Promise in
Multi-State Tort Law, 53 VA. L. Rav. 847 (1967).
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guidelines, it may be abused as a justification for a court to reach a pre-
determined result. 9
INDIVIDUAL ISSUES UNDER THE MODERN VIEWS
Under the modem approaches to the choice of law, the court must first
ascertain that a true conflict exists as to the particular issue in question.
This recognition of a true conflict presupposes the isolation of the various
issues presented, and results in the application of the choice of law process
to them individually. The courts consider the decisional factors of what-
ever approach they adopt in the context of their relevance to the issues
of the case individually, rather than to the case as a whole. Since the
advent of the modem approaches to the choice of law, trends have de-
veloped that may predict which law will apply to several individual issues
which recur in the tort litigation process.
Where the issue in conflict is intrafamily immunity, and the wrong
occurred in the forum state but the domicile of the parties was in another
state, the law of the other state has been held to apply."0 However, where
the parties were domiciled in the forum state and the tort was committed
in another state, the law of the forum applied.8 Thus, even under a
modem approach to choice of law, the same result obtains as that which
existed under the old concept of domicile.
Where wrongful death and survival statutes relate to the choice of law,
the courts often apply the law of the domicile of the deceased or his repre-
sentatives to determine the substantive rights of the parties. The law of the
domicile has been held to apply when the domicile is in the forum state
as well as when it is not." Furthermore, the law of the defendant's domi-
7 See, e.g., Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis.2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968) (dissenting
opinion), from which one might infer that the court is simply applying the law of the
forum while it goes through the motions of careful selection in accordance with
formal procedures.
S0 Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966). See Schwartz v. Schwartz,
103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968).
81 Doiron v. Doiron, 241 A.2d 372 (N.H. 1968); McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86,
215 A.2d 677 (1966). But see Roscoe v. Roscoe, 379 F.2d 94 (D.C. App. 1967), where,
on similar facts the other state's law was held to apply.
8 2 Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); DeFoor v. Lematta,
437 P.2d 107 (Ore. 1968); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796
(1964). For a similar application based on residence rather than domicile, see Ryan
v. Clark Equipment Co., 269 Cal. App. 2d 679, 74 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1969): See generally
Bannowsky v. Krauser, 294 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Colo. 1969).
1971]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
cile, also the place of injury, applies in an international conflicts situation.83
Cases presenting an issue of contribution among tortfeasors have, on
different rationale, accomplished the same practical result as the old
common law rule that the law of the place of the wrong applies.8 4
Whether the forum court will impose vicarious liability on its resident
as a result of a wrong committed in another jurisdiction, depends on the
law of the state where the defendant resides."
It has been held that the state where the wrong occurred has the
greatest interest in determining whether a spouse may recover for loss of
consortium upon an analysis of the interests and factors involved.8 6
When a resident of the forum state sues as a result of a tort committed
outside the state, the courts have refused to apply the guest statute of the
state where the tort was committed. This type of decision terms the
occurrence of the accident in the foreign state "fortuitous," and an insuf-
ficient relationship to make the foreign state's law controlling. When, on
the other hand, the forum state has a guest statute, and its residents are
injured in a state which does not, the court has held the forum state's
law to apply.88 However, the fact that the forum state does not have a
guest statute has been held not to prevent the forum court from applying
a foreign guest statute. 8
In addition, modern choice of law principles have been applied to
cases involving issues of workmen's compensation, 0 comparative negli-
S3 Tramontana v S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468
(D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966).
84Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968);
Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).
85 Farber v. Smolack, 20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967); See
generally Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc., 357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
86 Schneider v. Schimmels, 256 Cal. App. 2d 366, 64 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1967); Casey v.
Manson Const. & Eng. Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898. See Van Dyke v. Bolves, 107
N.J. Super 338, 258 A.2d 372 (1969).
87 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d (1963). See
Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Schneider v Nichols, 280 Minn. 139,
158 N.W.2d 254 (1968); Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274
N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966). But see Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 463,
262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965); Kuchinic v. McGrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966);
Conklin v. Horner, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
S8Dow v. Larrabee, 107 N.H. 70, 217 A.2d 506 (1966).
89 Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965). But see
Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970).
90 Howe v. Diversified Builders, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 741, 69 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1968).
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gence,9" and the civil consequences of statutory violation,"2 with varying
results.
CONCLUSION
In the area of torts, American choice of law doctrine is in a state of
post-revolutionary evolution. Since declaring their departure from the es-
tablished principles of lex loci delicti, many leading courts have set about
the evolutionary task of developing a new body of cohesive choice of law
principles to apply in the event that divergent laws of substance conflict.
Modem approaches to the choice of law seek to adjudicate the particular
issues raised in the litigation process according to the law of the state
which, by the employment of various procedures, may fairly be said to,
have the greatest interest in the resolution of the controversy. The par-
ticular means employed to accomplish these ends, however, are as sig-
nificant as the ends themselves because they control the extent to whiclh
essential fairness and justice will be successfully attained. Furthermore,,
the constitutional validity of a given state's approach to the choice of law
will probably depend on whether its particular method satisfies a "mini-
mum contacts" test similar to the test now applied to determine the consti-
tutionality of jurisdiction.
The modem approaches to the choice of law are substantially more than
disguised bases for the application of the forum court's own law, although
forum law is often applied as a result of their exercise. When properly
applied, they recognize that the forum state often has a legitimate interest
in the resolution of the particular dispute, and is usually more than a mere
convenient place to file suit.
Because of the lack of uniform, concrete principles leading to predict-
able results, some courts may be expected to remain reluctant to adopt
a modem approach to the choice of tort law. Other courts, however, will
weigh the necessity for substantial justice in individual cases more heavily
than the need for certainty and predictability. They will adopt the modem
approaches to choice of tort law in increasing numbers.
It should not be assumed that the ultimate approach to choice of law
lies within the limits of the presently defined theories. As the courts refine
the present approaches, new patterns will emerge. Even as the courts
misapply present doctrines, a process of cross-fertilization may produce
favorable hybrids. Furthermore, scholarly and judicial creativity may
91 Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc.,
60 Misc. 2d 840, 304 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct. 1969).92 Myers v. Gaither, 232 A.2d 577 (D.C. App. 1967).
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produce new theories that are totally foreign to modem choice of law
thinking. It is to be hoped that an increasing number of courts will turn
from the mechanical ease of lex loci delicti, and lend their efforts to the
creation of a new and better approach to the choice of tort law, so that
more favorable results might occur-sooner.
J. D. F. III
